What’s Next for The Gulf After the ASEAN and China Summit?
Alwi Akbar, Graduate Student, Middle East and Islamic Studies, Universitas Indonesia
President Trump, visited the three Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates on May 13 to May 16. The leaders of these countries agreed on economic cooperation in infrastructure investment and security.
The United States did this to restore China’s total dominance, which had been slowly displaced. China also has a large share of influence and material power in the Middle East region.
Meanwhile, the organisation of Southeast Asian countries, or ASEAN, has a cooperative relationship with the institutions of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and China itself. Then ASEAN, GCC, and China held a high-level meeting on 27th May 2025, in Kuala Lumpur.
How is the GCC positioned in this dynamic regarding jumbo investment value and China’s momentum in meetings with both organisations, following Trump’s manoeuvres in the Gulf region?
Trump Will Retake the Gulf
The visit to Saudi Arabia marked Trump’s role in the Middle East for his second term. The value of investment, which reached $600 billion, was the highest US achievement in its dealings with the Saudis.
Qatar also agreed on the value of investments, specifically in aviation. Qatar Airways purchased $200 billion worth of Boeing aircraft, the most significant purchase in the company’s history.
Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates is ambitious about generating $1.4 trillion worth of investment with the United States. Therefore, it is not wrong for the United States, mainly from Trump himself, to send an ambitious message to restore glory in the Middle East.
With China’s significant role in trade through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) program and the most considerable contribution to the diplomatic side, the United States’ position has begun to fade out in recent years.
Furthermore, China’s role in diplomatic positions to mediate the resolution of conflicts such as Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, and the reconciliation of Fatah and Hamas in 2024, makes the United States very threatened.
Therefore, Trump’s arrival in the Gulf region will likely impact several countries, particularly other Gulf countries and China.
On the other hand, in addition to China’s relations with the GCC countries, ASEAN is an essential partner in terms of trade and investment. The GCC also has significant ties with Southeast Asian countries in many sectors.
GCC Potential Offers to ASEAN
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a regional organisation in the Gulf, similar to ASEAN but with significantly greater economic potential. Both organisations aim to enhance economic and political security cooperation.
In general, the six GCC member states are promoting non-oil economic growth as their bargaining power in their foreign policies instead of relying on oil anymore. This change has occurred due to concerns about limited natural resources in the future.
The six GCC member states have a non-oil foreign policy on foreign investment, tourism, and industrialisation. Furthermore, based on the member states, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have quite strong long-term programs.
Saudi Arabia’s popular program through Saudi Vision 2030 is an example of one of the main focuses of tourism and global investment (in the context of activism in foreign economic policy). The United Arab Emirates has a financial program similar to Saudi Arabia’s and intends to play a role in its sustainable development.
Qatar emphasises its foreign policy through formal diplomacy, concentrating on regional security concerns and positioning itself as a principal conflict resolution gateway, rather than expanding soft power.
For context, the GCC was established in 1981 in response to the Iraq-Iran conflict in the 1980 Gulf War. The organisation is considered quite fragile regarding security issues due to the instability of interests among its member states.
The GCC formally intended to increase awareness of security issues in December 2023, with the Vision for Regional Security declaration. The main point is deterring terrorism through financial and logistical support to terrorist groups.
Qatar has played a more consistent formal role than Saudi Arabia, the most significant political power in the Gulf. The GCC must be run collectively, and its relationship with ASEAN offers a great opportunity based on its potential.
Regarding GCC-ASEAN relations, the security issue only focuses on communications and cooperation meetings through annual meetings and countering radicalism and extremism. GCCPOL and ASEANAPOL would technically discuss this issue further.
Therefore, with its global investment policy, economic strength is a strong starting advantage in meeting ASEAN’s needs in cooperation. As a context, ASEAN itself expects the GCC to be actively involved in the sustainable development of ASEAN Connectivity 2025.
Given its reputation for political diplomacy in reconciling regional conflicts such as Saudi-Iran and Hamas-Fatah, it is essential to capitalise on China’s momentum in the Middle East.
Furthermore, the GCC, with its economic bargaining power over ASEAN, could be a bridge between China’s mission to strengthen the BRI and the financial interests of the Gulf. It can be an asset for an alternative market alliance when dealing with the issue of American tariffs restricting the economic circulation of both regions.
Gulf Region’s Future in Post-Summit
After the summit, how much does the GCC need this cooperation, and what is its interest in ASEAN and China?
As mentioned, the economic sector will assume a predominantly significant role in free trade and market opportunities, especially in response to the recent American tariffs implemented a few months prior.
The GCC considers this summit a means to utilise ASEAN as a vehicle for expanding economic cooperation with China, broadening markets and supply chains in Southeast Asia that benefit the Gulf.
However, the GCC’s position in this summit is particularly questionable to ASEAN. The main issue is the Gulf’s commitment to every cooperation declaration and its translation into strategic implementation.
Many observers view the Gulf’s cooperation with ASEAN and China as primarily rhetorical, lacking a clear roadmap for implementing economic and diplomatic initiatives within regional institutions.
The Gulf’s future post-summit with ASEAN and China may vary. While short-term commitments persist, ASEAN and China are considered long-term partners for trade and strategic ties.
This offers the GCC a chance to develop a comprehensive trade and integration roadmap with China and ASEAN, focusing on financing, exports, and energy, through a strategic supply chain plan.
The biggest obstacle for the GCC in collaborating with these parties is the complex geopolitical landscape of the Gulf and the Middle East. In addition, the Palestine-Israel conflict adds another layer of complexity to the region, making it a “multitasking” environment.
Therefore, the GCC advanced its efforts to diversify strategic cooperation on economic objectives, primarily to lessen oil dependency concerning resource capacity and negotiating regional influence.
GCC needs consistency and cohesion to turn strategic interests into effective regional policy; However, it faces ongoing challenges in geopolitical stabilisation.
(RHZ/QOB)